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Governed by Marriage Law: An Irish Genealogy. 
Introduction. 
In recent years, European governments have used marriage law reform to signal their 
commitment to the principles of equality and social diversity. Equality for gays and 
lesbians will be achieved, it is claimed, through admission to the privileged status of 
marriage, allowing access to specific legal and fiscal privileges, and providing public 
endorsement of same-sex love and commitment. This movement toward ‘marriage 
equality’ assumes that marriage law, if applied equally to same and opposite sex 
couples, can solve the social problems of homophobia and heterosexism (Barker, 2013: 
126). The expectation that reform of marriage law can solve social problems is not 
unique to the present. Historically, marriage law has been offered as a solution to female 
poverty and sex-based discrimination, relationship breakdown and post-relationship 
financial vulnerability (Stone, 1990; Glendon, 1989).  
The progressive potential of more marriage law is often assumed by government and 
political campaigners, despite significant difficulties with existing legal rules. Scholars 
describe how marriage law epitomises patriarchy (Firestone, 1970; Pateman, 1988); 
constructs women as vulnerable and necessarily dependent (Smart, 1984); privatises the 
social cost of inevitable human dependency (Fineman, 2004; O’Donovan, 1985; 
 2 
 
Ferguson, 2007); imposes traditional values on modern relationships (Smart, 1997; Ryan 
2007); is veiled in secrecy making outcomes unpredictable (Coulter, 2009); and fails to 
produce justice for real, lived relationships (Diduck, 2003). How then has marriage law 
maintained its position as a valued instrument of social reform both at the level of the 
population and from the perspective of government?  
In this essay, I reflect on the governmental or political aspect of relationship 
regulation, identifying how marriage law has both created problems for government 
and, simultaneously, offered solutions to social and regulatory problems. Using Ireland 
as a case study example, I describe the history of marriage law reform from the 
perspective of government, how it has been deployed in furthering political objectives, 
and the role it plays in fulfilling political aspirations for more complete governance of 
the social domain.  
Governed by marriage law. 
Political regulation of marriage began in England in the 1750s, and one of the first pieces 
of social legislation enacted by the newly unified German was an act to regulate 
marriage.1 In France, marriage has been considered a matter for state regulation since 
the 1600s (Hanley, 1989). All western nations now regulate entry to and exit from 
marriage, and the legal consequences of relationship status are so far reaching as to be 
virtually impossible to catalogue (Barker, 2013: 28). Yet, the legal implications do not 
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begin to capture the full extent of its regulatory influence. The officially legitimated 
family can be relied upon to meet its own needs before calling on the state (Fineman, 
2004: 40-44). Marriage and family iconography contributes to the construction and 
maintenance of gender roles (Diduck, 2003), promoting unpaid care work and 
legitimating discriminatory employment practices (Gittins, 1993). The family can offer 
practical solutions to problems with morality, health and procreation, and has been used 
throughout history to implement programs of social reform (Donzelot, 1977). 
 Marriage law forges a powerful link between the personal and the political, 
connecting the aspirations of individuals to the regulatory ambitions of the state (Smart, 
1984). The process of marriage law reform, in itself, has effects at the level of individual 
relationships, translating personal experience into legal discourse and shaping people’s 
understanding of their own lives (Smart, 1984, 2004). Political debate around marriage 
law reform builds images of the good life that both reflects and shapes individual 
aspirations, and legal authorisation of relationship practices has come to signal socio-
cultural authorisation, re-enforcing both cultural practices and the necessity of law 
(Cherlin 2009, 66). The central importance of the authorised, conjugal couple to the 
process of social government means that the state has a significant stake in how 
relationships are performed, and legal rules regulating and authorising marriage and 
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other familial relationships are now central to the political administration of our 
collective lives.  
 
 Foucault’s description of the process of government in the modern liberal 
democratic state as ‘the conduct of conducts’ (Foucault, 2000: 341), suggests a way to 
understand how, and for what purpose, the personal, familial practices of individuals 
have become matters of concern for the state. He maintains that the modern state, in 
governing the population for which it is responsible, aims not to command obedience, 
but to take control of lives and to regularise them using techniques that are 
‘enlightened, reflective, analytical, calculated and calculating’ (Foucault, 2007: 91). 
These techniques are deployed in order to direct, lead and guide individuals toward 
social behaviours considered ‘natural’ by government, working through their freedom 
to act and capacity to self-govern (van Krieken, 2001: 6). This notion of government thus 
encompasses the many ways in which the behaviour of individuals or groups might be 
directed, and draws attention to the relationship between political government, the 
regulatory capacities of non-state actors and institutions, and the capacities of individual 
citizens to govern themselves. It also invites reflection on how the process of 
government is rationalised, the conceptual frameworks within which those responsible 
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for government identify particular social behaviours as optimal and how this is 
connected to social understandings of normal or natural behaviour. 
Locating the role of law in general, and marriage law in particular, in the process of 
government is not straightforward, and from the outset requires rejection of 
jurisprudential notions of ‘law’ as a unified regulatory structure that solves social and 
political difficulties (Walby, 2007: 556). Rather, law must be fragmented and decentred, 
and focus shifted to how particular difficulties come to be seen as a target for 
government and how ‘the legal complex’ is implicated in strategies of regulation (Rose 
and Valverde, 1998: 546). Legal expertise and techniques must take their place among 
more general apparatuses of governmental control that intervene in the lives of 
individuals in response to information collected about those lives (Tadros, 1998: 93.). 
Viewing law in this way facilitates an analysis of the potentially diverse roles legal rules 
and processes play in the implementation of political strategies, but also of how legal 
expertise displaces other ways of thinking about and solving political difficulties (Baxter 
1992). The path of Irish marriage law reform, in particular, demonstrates how, in the 
domain of family life, legal discourse can colonise identification of social problems and 
efforts to solve them. Women’s post-relationship poverty, seen in terms of men’s legal 
obligations, is removed from its structural context, leaving barriers to self-sufficiency 
intact (Smart, 1984: 191). Rationalising judicial separation or divorce law as a way to 
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save marriage means that no realistic attempt is made to enable the construction of 
post-relationship lives. Adding more categories of couple to the category ‘authorised’ 
avoids engagement with the complexity of lived families (Boyd, 1999; Richardson 2004). 
Alternative ways of knowing about, and addressing, social difficulties are elided by the 
dominance of legal expertise.  
In order to diagnose the role of marriage law in the process of government I adopt a 
genealogical approach to history (Foucault, 1984), focusing on how meanings are 
produced and attached to social subjects and objects over time. I consider how, over a 
discrete historical period, in one exemplary jurisdiction, social relationship practices 
were identified as problematic, and how solutions to those problems were formulated 
at the level of government. A fully contextualised analysis within a governance 
framework removes law’s privilege, but it also facilitates the mapping of programs of 
marriage law reform onto the shifting conceptual frameworks within which modern 
government aims to manage, optimize, and normalise the lives of its citizens (Foucault 
2003: 247). The meaning of ‘marriage’ has shifted over time as the Irish government re-
focused re-shaped its understanding of what it means to govern well, yet the marriage 
based family has remained central to how regulation of the social domain is achieved. 
Further, despite proving largely ineffective to solve social problems, marriage law 
retains a pivotal role in political attempts to shape social practice. Pro-marriage rhetoric 
 7 
 
and the intensification of regulatory structures around the authorised conjugal couple 
act to encourage ways of living that support shifting governmental objective and the 
connection forged by the marriage law complex between personal and political 
aspirations means that, despite significant social, economic and political change, 
marriage law remains an important political technique. It supports the normalising 
objectives of politics by directly promoting lifetime conjugality in the interests of social 
stability, and indirectly by acting on our capacity to manage our own lives in ways that 
support political understandings of what it means to govern well. 
Ireland. 
Using Ireland as an example, this research describes the process of marriage law reform 
between 1970 and 2010 in its social and economic context, focusing on the problems 
that marriage law was intended to address and the conceptual framework within which 
the Irish government pursued legal reform. Ireland is an exemplary case study because 
most European jurisdictions have taken hundreds of years to build a body of law 
corresponding to that enacted in Ireland in the past fifty years (Stone 1992; Barker 2010; 
Glendon, 1989). When Ireland gained independence from Britain in 1922, it inherited a 
body of marriage law built upon the political concerns of a colonial power, and the 
ecclesiastical rules of a church with few Irish adherents. The 1937 Constitution, at Article 
41, pledged to protect the institution of marriage ‘upon which the Family is founded,’ 
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but in practice the regulation of the marriage relationship itself was left entirely within 
the authority of the various churches. Nonetheless, its position at the centre of a 
network of social power meant that the marriage-based family became a relay for 
government. Lifetime, gendered, dependency marriage was assumed by public 
institutions, and rendered married women largely invisible to politics. Beginning in the 
1970s, however, successive governments pursued a program of marriage law reform, 
culminating in a 2015 plebiscite that made Ireland the first country in the world to 
extend marriage to same-sex couples by popular vote. In a relatively short period, 
Ireland had moved from exclusively socio-religious regulation to the European frontier 
of marriage law.  
Problematising2 marriage. 
Between the foundation of the state and the 1960s, the Irish government accepted 
dependency marriage as an unproblematic and familiar set of practices, outside of 
politics. Representing a lifetime commitment, the obligations of marriage were shaped 
by the religious beliefs of the vast majority of the Irish population, who accepted 
Catholicism as the essence of their identity and their county’s ethos (Fuller, 2002: xiii). 
Religious and cultural understandings, both at the level of the population, and within 
government, excluded the state from direct intervention in family life. As a result state 
services were routed through male heads of household; personal taxation, social 
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insurance and (limited) social assistance programs presumed that women and children 
were maintained and protected by men.  
A Keynesian policy shift in the 1960s led to a sustained period of economic growth, 
a halting of emigration and a dramatic increase in government revenues (Kennedy et al, 
1998). It also precipitated the centralisation and expansion of the social welfare system 
(Cousins, 1995: 21). In order to expand welfare provision, government needed to 
identify deserving recipients of social transfers. One such worthy group were vulnerable, 
deserted, left destitute following the failure of male support. The wilful abandonment 
and failure to support a wife and children had been a criminal offence since the 
foundation of the State,3 and men without means risked prosecution following the 
failure of their marriage. The phenomenon of ‘wife desertion’ was thus linked to 
criminality and social disorder; deserted wives were victims of crime, punished by stigma 
and poverty, their husbands were criminals punished by law.  Desertion evidenced moral 
transgression and left families without male protection. The state, aiming to preserve 
the integrity and status of the gendered, marriage-based family differentiated deserted 
wives from the mass of indigents reliant on discretionary public assistance, took the 
place of the absent husbands, and made deserted wives one of the first beneficiaries of 
the developing, centralised welfare system.4 Provision of welfare for these women 
inevitably led to the production of statistics detailing the prevalence of desertion, and 
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to political concern with minimising its occurrence. Politics had begun to assume 
responsibility for the welfare of the population, and as it did so, family and relationship 
characteristics and practices became a particular concern of government. 
 
Marriage law as a solution to ‘desertion’ in the 1970s. 
A number of women’s rights organisations emerged at the end of the 1960s with a 
mainly liberal feminist agenda. They advocated a statutory right to maintenance and 
effective enforcement mechanisms as the solution to the problem of desertion 
(Galligan, 1998: 91). A government appointed Commission on the Status of Women also 
recommended reform of maintenance law to address the financial difficulties 
experienced by deserted wives. The Commission formulated its recommendations in 
terms of legal rights, interpreting Article 6 of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in light of Article 41 of the Irish 
Constitution to formulate a right for women to adopt a dependent role in marriage 
(Commission on Status of Women, 1973: 227).  
Similarly, a Government appointed Committee, asked to ‘to examine and make 
recommendations on the substantive law as to the desertion of wives,’ focused on the 
‘pressing social evil’ of desertion, which was ‘on the increase.’ Deserted wives were 
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identified as victims of ‘abandonment,’ and ‘ill treatment,’ and existing marriage law as 
inadequate to meet their needs. The committee found that there was ‘a real need for 
radical change in the legal provisions relating to the provision of maintenance for 
deserted spouses and families’ (Committee on Court Practice, 1974: 7, 14 – 15). By 1975, 
political discussion of desertion had been colonised by legal formulations of marriage 
and its obligations. Experts proposed solutions in legal terms, emphasising Article 41 of 
the Constitution, with its statement of the social primacy of marriage and the place of 
women within it. The Minster for Justice, in introducing a Bill to reform the rules on 
spousal maintenance, referenced Article 41, in particular its marriage protection 
imperative. The legislation imposed a lifetime, mutual support obligation on spouses, 
offering maintenance without proof that either husband or wife had left the marital 
home. The Minister reasoned that the Bill would therefore: 
strengthen marriages by no longer obliging wives who have been badly neglected by 
their husbands to leave the home … the widely held view nowadays is that … indeed 
such an action could possibly be a factor that would save a family relationship.5 
Ideas about the horror of desertion and its links to criminality and poverty, the legal 
rights of women and their vulnerability, the moral obligations of men, came together in 
a political drive to save marriage. 
Maintenance and family home protection legislation enacted in 19766 marked a 
transformation in the relationship between politics and marriage in Ireland; politics 
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wanted something from the marriage relationship itself. Legal mechanisms were 
deployed in an attempt to take control of relationship practices and maximise those 
considered normal, and optimal, by government. The choice of what constituted natural 
or normal relationship behaviour was largely based on preponderant social practice and 
the tenets of dominant morality, and marriage law was enacted with the explicit 
purpose of saving marriage. Government accepted that lifetime dependency marriage 
was an essential social institution in need of protection, but it also needed citizens to 
perform marriage because it was central to the social management imperative of 
Keynesianism. Marriage was a transfer point between the state and individual interests, 
and the process of law reform both engaged with, and reinforced, social understandings 
of the nature of the marital relationship. The objective of marriage law reform in the 
1970s was quite specific – it was intended to ensure the performance of lifetime 
dependency marriage. Of course, this was an objective doomed to failure. That all 
marriages did not last for life, nor adopt the dependency paradigm was already 
apparent, but government accepted the basic moral premise that marriage was a social 
good, essential to the functioning and good governance of society. 
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The problem of marriage breakdown. 
The oil crisis of 1973 put an end to the economic expansion of the 1960s, but the 
government, on the assumption that this was a temporary difficulty, borrowed heavily 
to fund further expansion in public expenditure (Lee, 1989: 471). Government 
involvement in the economy had increased hugely in the period since independence, 
but more particularly between 1973 and 1985 when the ratio of public expenditure to 
gross national product rose from 42 percent to 67 percent (Kennedy et al, 1998: 87). 
Nonetheless, the economic situation did not improve, and by the end of the decade one 
fifth of the labour force were unemployed, despite levels of emigration not experienced 
since the 1950s (Kennedy et al, 1998: 93). Marriage remained pivotal to the 
administration of the expanding welfare state, and administration of the social domain 
was predicated on dependency model marriage (Second Commission on Status of 
Women, 1993: 17). Despite the enactment of maintenance legislation in 1976, the 
number of deserted wives and children in receipt of welfare assistance continued to 
increase. Legal ordering had failed to achieve conformity with the received norm of 
lifetime marriage; women and children persisted in falling out from under men’s wings, 
creating a charge on public funds, threatening moral decline and social disorder.7  
. A 1983 labour force survey estimated that there were 21,100 separated and 
deserted persons in the country (Commission on Social Welfare 1986: 121), and the 
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1986 census, which for the first time included a question designed to measure marriage 
breakdown, identified 40,000 people who were separated, deserted, or remarried 
following divorce (Lunn et al, 2009: 45). Statistics made the phenomenon of ‘marriage 
breakdown’ visible, giving it a material reality and designating it as a social risk that could 
happen to anyone (Ewald, 1990: 146). Government responded to the perceived crisis in 
family stability by appointing a Joint Committee ‘to consider the protection of marriage 
and of family life’ (Joint Committee on Marital Breakdown, 1985: vii). A decrease in the 
rate of marriage was a ‘cause for concern’ for the committee making it ‘necessary to 
tackle the problems which give rise to this’ and to ‘make marriage as secure and viable 
as humanly possible.’ Thus, ‘much of the committee’s deliberations focused on the 
protection of marriage and family life’ (Committee on Marital Breakdown, 1985: vii). It 
was assumed that marriage was a social good, and marriage breakdown (or alternative 
relationship practices) a social problem. Crucially, the phenomenon of marriage 
breakdown was the problem, not its practical effects at the level of individual lives. 
Marriage failure represented a deviation, a countable abnormality, and in order to 
protect stability in family life mechanisms had ‘to be installed around [this] random 
element inherent in [the] population so as to maximise a state of life’ (Foucault, 2003: 
247). 
 
Laws role in identifying ‘normal’ relationship practice.  
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During the 1980s, legal articulations were central to both the meaning of ‘marriage’ and 
its construction as a social good worthy of protection. The Committee on Marital 
Breakdown relied on the Superior Courts’ description of marriage as ‘permanent, 
indissoluble union of man and woman,’8 rooted in the ‘natural law.’9 The social truth of 
Article 41, and the self-evident advantages of marriage, had been endorsed by a series 
of high profile court decision during the decade. In Murphy v Ireland, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that marriage had a privileged position in the natural order and could not be 
penalised by fiscal measures. The supremacy of marriage was also endorsed in O’B v S, 
where the court refused to interpret the word ‘issue’ in the Succession Act 1965 to 
include children born outside marriage. In Dennehy v Minister for Social Welfare, the 
High Court held that making a social welfare payment available to a deserted wife, but 
not a deserted husband, was not, having regard to Article 41.2 of the Constitution and 
a wife’s important social function, ‘unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary.’ In Hyland v 
Minister for Social Welfare, the Supreme Court declared parts of the social welfare code 
unconstitutional because they ‘penalised the married state.’ Legal expertise had 
identified optimal relationship behaviour, but this simply reflected and consolidated all 
of the notions about marriage that had circulated between politics, religion, and 
individual practice since the foundation of the State. 
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Legal articulations provided a justification for political intervention to ‘save 
marriage,’ and the Law Reform Commission (LRC), established in 1976, demonstrated 
the utility of legal process in supervising marriage practices, publishing its First Report 
on Family Law in 1981. The theme of the report was the ‘protection of the family against 
damage to the continuity and stability of relationships among its members’ (LRC, 1981: 
2). Seven further reports on family law were published between 1982 and 1985, 
revealing the historic importance of law and legal mechanisms in the management of 
individual marriages and demonstrating law’s efficacy in identifying and containing 
abnormal marital behaviour. The Commission’s methodology was to state existing legal 
rules and then make proposals for reform. As a result, its reports contained detailed 
accounts of historical (often British and centuries old) case law detailing marital 
irregularity, individual deviance and aberration. It also laid claim to the continuance of 
legal machinery into the future and demonstrated that marriage failure, when seen from 
a legal perspective, was an individual failure. Specific spouses, with particular 
disadvantages were unable to maintain lifetime marriages; their problems were 
personal, not social or structural. In the application of legal rules the state, which 
increasingly defined the contours of family life, ‘remained invisible’ (Smart, 1984: 191). 
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Saving marriage with divorce. 
The Irish Constitution, as promulgated in 1937, specifically prohibited the enactment of 
legislation facilitating the dissolution of marriage. By the mid-1980s this ban had become 
central to political discussion of marriage breakdown. The introduction of divorce, was 
not, however, seen by government as a way to end failed marriages. Rather, it was 
conceptualised as a route to the stabilisation of ‘irregular unions’ (Dillon, 1993: 33). The 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 1986 proposed the removal of Article 41.3.2, 
and its replacement with a restrictive framework within which marriage could be 
dissolved. Throughout debate on the Bill, deputies and senators emphasised the 
potential for remarriage, and the over-riding theme of both the pro and anti-divorce 
campaigns was the protection of marriage, each side arguing that their position was the 
best way to achieve this objective. 
Although the Bill was passed by the Oireachtas, it was rejected by voters in a 
referendum. Anti-divorce campaigners focused on the shift of legal protection from first 
to second families implicit in the government’s proposal, and how such shift would 
impact, in particular, on ‘discarded’ first wives. As the first family would no longer be 
based on marriage, it would have no entitlement to constitutional protection, and 
women who entered such marriages in good faith expecting them to last for life would 
be left without the incidents of the marriage protection doctrine (Dillon, 1993). Despite 
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the pro-divorce side also emphasising the need to protect marriage, its focus on the 
relief of suffering caused by inability to remarry meant that it had no effective counter-
argument to the allegation that first families would suffer financial hardship. So intense 
was the relationship between marriage and the state, that imagining family life outside 
marriage was politically impossible. Facilitating a replacement spouse, ‘saving marriage’ 
was the only conceivable solution to the problem of marriage breakdown.  
Without a mandate to introduce divorce, but with marriage-protection a political 
imperative, government settled for comprehensive reform of the existing 
ecclesiastically based law governing judicial separation. The Judicial Separation and 
Family Law Reform Act 1989 apportioned blame for marital failure, facilitated 
suspension of the obligation to cohabit, and allocated property between spouses. It also 
adopted new ways of thinking about managing marriage breakdown; reconciliation, 
mediation and separation by agreement were an integral part of the legislative 
framework. For those unable to manage the breakdown of their own marriage, an 
intricate, court-based machinery was established designed to re-make post-relationship 
lives in the image of lifetime marriage. The legislation provided no route, other than 
remarriage (following a foreign divorce) or death of a recipient spouse, out of the legal 
or financial obligations of marriage. For those who could not rescue their relationships 
through the self-governing techniques of counselling or mediation, the litigation process 
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provided a way to individualise, and remove from public view, the effects of the failure 
of dependency marriage. 
Political aims – legal solutions. 
In the 1980s, dependency model marriage continued to act as an instrument of 
government, facilitating the distribution of welfare and the collection of tax. Statistics 
demonstrating the prevalence of ‘marriage breakdown’ brought it into political focus. 
Marriage was accepted as normal social behaviour, a self-evident social good; marriage 
breakdown was a threat to social well-being. Increased political interest in marriage 
breakdown corresponded with the expansion of the judicial review jurisdiction of the 
superior courts who, from a position of presumed neutrality, formulated a marriage 
protection doctrine based on the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution. The form 
of marriage deserving protection, according to the courts, was that described by the 
Constitution and largely corresponded to dominant social practice and the form of 
relationship assumed by government in managing the social domain. An attempt to 
introduce provision for dissolution of marriage by referendum failed, because in 
focusing on the capacity for remarriage, government was (in a social context where 
wives depended on their husbands for their means of existence) recommending a form 
of polygamy. The referendum, nonetheless, emphasised the essential legal quality of 
the marriage relationship and the political objective of marriage saving was, at the end 
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of the decade, pursued through reformed marriage law. The problem with marriage thus 
identified in the 1980s was marriage breakdown, the solution to this difficulty was to 
save marriage, and the conceptual framework within which it was to be achieved was 
drawn from morally bound legal expertise. The ‘legal complex’ (Rose and Valverde, 
1998: 144) adopted a number of roles that acted (even when purporting to challenge 
political action) to support the marriage saving objectives of government. Law defined 
marriage and justified its privileging, it offered a mechanism for identifying and 
containing abnormal relationship behaviour, and it personalised the problematic effects 
of marriage breakdown, removing them from their structural context.  
Marriage saving divorce in the 1990s. 
Economic conditions improved in the 1990s, immigration replaced emigration, and 
increasing numbers of women remained in the workforce after marriage (Walsh, 2004). 
Social practice began to move away from dependency marriage, marriage and birth 
rates fell, and by the end of the decade more than one in six births took place outside 
marriage (Second Commission, 1993: 67). The Supreme Court in Hyland had struck down 
a section of the social welfare code that gave larger welfare payments to cohabiting 
couples than to similarly situate married couples. Parallel disparities applied in other 
parts of the social welfare code, and following a review, the definition of ‘spouse’ for 
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social welfare purposes was extended to include ‘a man and a woman who are not 
married to each other but are cohabiting as man and wife,’10 allowing downward 
revision of welfare payments to cohabitees.  
Despite acknowledging the existence of cohabitation as a social practice, 
government continued to insist upon the primacy of marriage. A 1992 white paper on 
marital breakdown described the objective of government as ‘the preservation of stable 
marriage and the avoidance of marriage breakdown’ (Department of Justice, 1992: 9). 
The paper suggested that divorce could promote relationship stability by removing the 
need for ‘people whose marriages have broken down to … form “second unions”’ 
(Department of Justice, 1992: 24). Relationship counselling was also proposed to 
prevent marriage failure. Psychological expertise and reformed marriage law, it was 
assumed, could protect marriage, and if necessary, deal with the effects of marriage 
breakdown. The white paper identified poverty among women as the principle practical 
effect of marriage breakdown. It also noted the inability of maintenance rules to address 
this poverty, and the connection between dependency in marriage and poverty 
following breakdown. Nonetheless, the report’s principle recommendation was a 
divorce jurisdiction with comprehensive financial reliefs. In response to this report, 
government substantially reformed the 1989 Act and began preparations a referendum. 
The Family Law Act 1995 was intended to provide a model for future divorce legislation 
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and extend the range of financial orders available on Judicial Separation. Provision was 
made for more comprehensive ancillary relief; a new pension adjustment order was 
introduced, and variation provisions were updated to facilitate unlimited applications 
for property adjustment orders.11 The continuing nature of spousal support obligations 
was thus enhanced, rather than diminished, in anticipation of divorce. 
A proposed amendment to the Constitution was drafted, and a referendum set for 
30 November 1995. The prohibition on divorce would be replaced with a statement of 
the terms upon which a marriage could be dissolved by the Court. An information paper 
was circulated by Government prior to the referendum stating that government was 
‘strongly committed to protecting the family and the institution of marriage,’ 
(Department of Equality, 1995: 5) and that this commitment was ‘central to 
government’s position on divorce.’ In debate on the referendum Bill, the Minister for 
Justice drew attention to ‘the authenticity of government support for marriage’ 
demonstrated by ‘the package of action, involving both laws and services, to prevent 
marriage breakdown in so far as possible.’ This included ‘Department of Equality and 
Law Reform funding for marriage counselling organisations which provide pre-marriage 
counselling and assist marriages under stress.’12 The message was clear; marriages must 
be saved, using professionals paid by the state if necessary. On a practical level, and 
perhaps decisive for the electorate, government re-ordered the social welfare system 
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to ensure that both first and subsequent wives could claim benefits based on a 
husband’s social insurance contributions. 
The Fifteenth Amendment Bill passed by a slim majority. The Family Law (Divorce) 
Act 1997 provided for divorce without proof of marital fault, following the separation of 
the spouses for a period of four out of the previous five years. Fault was not wholly 
irrelevant. The conduct of each of the spouses was a factor to be taken into 
consideration in making of ancillary financial orders ‘if that conduct is such that in the 
opinion of the court it would in all the circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard 
it.’13 The Act envisaged financial orders being available following divorce, save in cases 
where the recipient had remarried, thus ensuring the continuation of the financial 
obligations of marriage beyond its legal dissolution.  
‘Proper provision’ for spouses and children was a constitutional prerequisite to the 
grant of a decree of divorce, but its content was left to judicial discretion. Neither was 
any legislative guidance given to the court regarding how it should determine that there 
was ‘no reasonable prospect of reconciliation,’14 or whether the parties have indeed 
lived apart for four out of the previous five years. As with judicial separation, a list of 
factors to be taken into account by the court in making financial awards was provided, 
but the termination of financial obligation was not one of them. Marriage, as defined by 
the Act, was a semi-terminable relationship which produced unpredictable post-
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relationship obligations that were subject to continual review during the lifetime of 
former spouses. 
Marriage, somewhat paradoxically, became more popular as a social practice 
following the introduction of divorce. Fahey (2012) has suggested that this was the 
result of improved economic conditions, and perhaps this is so, but by the end of the 
1990s, marriage was no longer a social pre-requisite to family status, couple formation 
or parenting. Nonetheless, it experienced a resurgence at the level of social practice, 
despite the onerous obligations imposed by marriage law.15 In the 1990s, Government 
feared marriage breakdown because it threatened social stability and created a charge 
on public resources. The population also feared marriage breakdown, for themselves 
and their children, but they also sought constitutional protection (highlighted publically 
and at length through two intensely contested national plebiscites) and the increasing 
range of fiscal benefits conferred upon the marriage-based family. The legal complex 
surrounding the authorised conjugal family had further entrenched the connection 
between the aims of government and the personal aspirations of citizens.  
Family practices, social stability and economic growth – the 2000s. 
Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973 when it was a political and 
economic initiative. By the 1990s, the EEC had developed a strong social policy role. A 
specific link between economic and social development was made in the governing 
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treaties, and closer union between member states was predicated on both economic 
and social cohesion. The Amsterdam Treaty inserted a new Article 2 into the governing 
treaties making an explicit link between social protection and economic government. 
This connection was given further weight in Ireland between 1987 and 2003 by six 
partnership agreements entered into between government, trade unions, employer 
groups, and later, representatives of civil society. The purpose of this process was the 
maintenance of a low-inflation economy with a stable exchange rate, producing higher 
standards of living, and improved social services. Social inclusion was a central aim, 
particularly in later agreements, and was to be achieved ‘through a strengthening of 
economic capacity and the adoption of a coherent inclusion strategy’ (Department of 
the Taoiseach, 2000: 4). The form of social inclusion envisaged was predicated on 
workforce participation. Partnership 2000 stated that unemployment was the single 
biggest contributor to social exclusion and therefore the most effective strategy for 
achieving greater social inclusion was an increase in employment (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2000: 19). Direct control over monetary policy was removed from individual 
States following the currency union adopted under the Maastricht Treaty, but strict 
controls on inflation and growth were imposed by Europe. The partnership strategy 
maintained economic stability, as required by the European Union, and achieved the 
 26 
 
desired outcome of significant economic growth. By the late 1990s, Ireland’s economy 
was considered one of the best performing in Europe.16 
The marriage-based family, as the central institution around which social provision 
orbited, was uniquely placed to mediate the implementation of social policies 
necessitated by European integration. Whilst previously government had formulated its 
support for families in terms of direct financial transfers, by the end of the 1990s a much 
more interventionist approach emerged. It was no longer acceptable to simply subsidise 
families, they needed to be supported in order to ‘combat disadvantage and social 
exclusion by improving the functioning of the family unit.’ (Daly and Clavero, 2002: 63). 
Such an aim could not be achieved, within a technocratic and economically rational 
approach to government, without significant investigation and consideration of the Irish 
family, and by 2001, Fahey and Russell were able to note a ‘considerable policy interest 
in various aspects of family behaviour.’(2001: 56)  
A government appointed Commission produced a detailed report in 1997 that 
reviewed family policy and concluded that marriage had clear advantages from a public 
policy perspective, ‘in promoting security and stability in family life and in providing 
continuity in society’ (Commission on the Family, 1998: 183). Sociologists contributing 
to the Commission’s report drew on the ‘individualisation’ thesis of family change 
(Giddens, 1992) arguing that the modern condition had created companionate 
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relationships based on feelings, which were more fragile than relationships with an 
institutional base, and therefore required effort and professional counselling assistance 
to survive. The report led to the establishment of a Family Affairs Unit in the Department 
of Social Community and Family Affairs, a Family Support Agency, and to a significant 
increase in funding for relationship counselling and social research into the nature and 
structure of the Irish family. Social science had replaced morality in the rationalisation 
of marriage and family life, providing scientific support for the preferential status of 
marriage and supporting increased governmental intervention in the management of 
individual lives. 
 
The economic imperative of gender equality and two adult households. 
As economic growth continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Irish 
population proved inadequate to support the demands of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy. 
Immigration became a feature of Irish population growth, and domestic policy focused 
on labour market activation measures. Women, particularly those performing a 
domestic role, became a particular target. The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 
in 2000 (mirroring the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty) specifically connected 
gender equality imperatives to the needs of the expanding economy. The program 
emphasised that women must be facilitated in their aspirations for equal treatment 
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because it served economic needs. Men were to be encouraged to share with women 
‘the caring responsibilities carried out within the home for children and dependent 
family members,’ because this would facilitate the entry of women into the labour 
market. A society must be created in which access to labour is ‘available to all.’ Supply 
must be mobilised by ‘tapping into potential pools of labour to support sustainable low 
inflationary growth’ (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000: 116). The terms of the Irish 
Constitution had not changed, but women were no longer defined by marital status, and 
wives were not mothers in the home needing protection. Women, wives and mothers, 
like other ‘disadvantaged groups’ (Department of the Taoiseach, 2000: 116) were a 
supply of labour to be called upon in support of the governmental growth imperative. 
Family stability was also essential to the pursuit of economic development. 
Households with children headed by two adults caused considerably less difficulty for 
labour-market activation measures than those with just one resident parent (NESC, 
2001:60). A historical focus on supporting women qua mothers through welfare 
payments until their children were adults had created a welfare trap for single parents 
who wished to work. Similar barriers existed to the formation of two-parent households, 
and this issue was raised in a number of government sponsored research reports. 
Despite detailed assessment of the issue, experts were unable to reach a conclusion 
beyond the desirability of cohabitation over lone parenthood (NESC, 2001:95). The 
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acceptability of cohabitation, for the middle classes, was endorsed by the 
individualisation of the income tax code, completed in 2001. The income tax advantage 
of marriage over cohabitation, and the tax privileging of dependency marriage, were 
largely removed for those who paid tax at the higher rate (McGowan, 2015: 330). 
Government considered it necessary to achieve an increased rate of couple formation 
because this would lead to decreased levels of lone parenting, and greater workforce 
participation, particularly among women with dependent children. The functional 
characteristics of couple relationships had become more important than their 
institutional form. 
Secularising marriage. 
Although ‘marriage,’ had been instrumental in the administration of the social domain 
since the foundation of the Irish State, it had remained undefined in legislation until 
2004. The Civil Registration Act 2004 codified the operation of the Central Registrar’s 
office, necessarily involving a statutory statement of the rules governing entry into 
marriage. The Act listed impediments to marriage, including age, consanguinity, pre-
existing marriage, mental incapacity, and both parties being of the same sex. The 
marriage ceremony was to be ‘solemnised’ following a three month notice period during 
which time both parties had to attend in person at the registrar’s office to sign a 
declaration that there was no impediment to their marriage. The registrar was required 
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to request detailed information from the parties, and could, if required by the Minister, 
publish details of forthcoming marriages. Marriage, following the 2004 Act, was no 
longer a social practice that government recognised and deployed in managing the social 
domain. It became a fully legal status, available only to those who had complied with 
the detailed provisions of the Civil Registration Act 2004. Although the 2004 Act was the 
first codification of the legal rules for entry into marriage since the foundation of the 
State, there was no discussion of the nature of marriage during Oireachtas debates, in 
contrast to earlier debates on divorce and judicial separation, which focused almost 
entirely on its institutional and transcendent characteristics. It now seemed universally 
accepted that marriage was a committed long-term companionate relationship based 
on contract, a civil and legal matter fully within the domain of state regulation. 
Legal expertise – human rights imperatives and the right to marry. 
The legal principle of equality or non-discrimination, although reflected in the Irish 
Constitution, gained discursive vigour in the 2000s via the activities of the European 
Union and its institutions. The Amsterdam Treaty had particular influence in the Irish 
context, leading to the enactment of the Employment Equality Act 1998 and Equal Status 
Act 2000. The deployment of rights based arguments by campaigners for marriage law 
reform emerged around the same time as these legislative enactments, reflecting the 
increased influence of European equality imperatives on Irish political discourse. The 
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Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which recorded a settlement agreement in relation to 
Northern Ireland, pushed the human rights agenda further to the fore in the Republic.  
Following the Good Friday Agreement, which required Ireland to have similar 
protection for human rights as existed in the United Kingdom,17 a Human Rights 
Commission was established, and the European Convention on Human Rights was 
incorporated into domestic Law. Establishing and funding a Human Rights Commission 
represented an acknowledgement by the Irish government of the political potential of 
international rights norms. It also provided a forum for discussion, and an expert body 
ready to identify how government should act to vindicate rights. By the beginning of the 
2000s, human rights and equality had become appropriate world views within which to 
formulate policy. Specific bodies had been established to inform government, and 
reflecting the continued social importance of marriage, directed their attention to the 
issue of marriage law. Four of the nine forms of discrimination set out in the Equal Status 
Act 2000 had application to the area of marriage law: gender, marital status, family 
status and sexual orientation. It is therefore not surprising that one of the first reports 
published by the Equality Authority related to couple relationships (Mee and Ronayne, 
2000). The report was a careful account of the specifically legal disadvantages suffered 
by same-sex couples in negotiating their joint lives. Although making no 
recommendations, the title of the report, Partnership Rights of Same-sex Couples, 
 32 
 
placed the issues clearly within the domain of relationship regulation. It assumed that 
legal rights should attach to couple relationships, and the comparisons made in the 
report between the position of married couples and same-sex couples who could not 
marry clearly suggested that the inequalities identified should be addressed through the 
extension of marriage law. A second Equality Authority report, published in 2002 also 
identified the specific disadvantages of same-sex couples vis a vis married couples, but 
also made recommended extension of marriage law to gay and lesbian couples(Equality 
Authority, 2002). The exclusionary effect of marriage law was identified, but there no 
suggestion that the privileges of marriage should be removed from heterosexual 
couples. It was accepted that the officially legitimated couple should have economic and 
social advantages. 
The growing consensus on the need to reform marriage law was further evidenced 
by a 2006 report commissioned by the Human Rights Commission on the Rights and 
Duties of De Facto Couples (Walsh and Ryan, 2006). This report focused on international 
human rights standards, assessing ‘the adequacy of Irish law in the light of that 
International framework.’ Within this conceptual scaffold, it was possible only to see the 
inequalities between one form of couple relationship and another, no account was 
taken of wider inequalities produced by the privileging of couple relationships. Also in 
2006, the Department of Justice appointed a working group to examine ‘the categories 
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of partnerships and relationships outside of marriage to which legal recognition might 
be accorded, consistent with Constitutional provisions.’(Working Group on Domestic 
Partnerships, 2006: 10). The report focused on ‘key objectives for advancing equality,’ 
which included, not only the eradication of specific material or legislative disadvantage, 
but also the need to accord ‘visibility and value to diversity’ (Working Group on Domestic 
Partnerships, 2006: 17). It was considered important that a visible form of legitimation 
be available to couples willing and able to commit to long term stable relationships. 
The need for relationship stability. 
In the 2000s, the Irish government pursued a project of economic growth predicated on 
social stability and increased labour market participation. Traditional marriage practices 
denied equality and self-actualisation to women, but they also removed workers from 
the labour force. Lone parents created significant difficulties for government, remaining 
stubbornly disadvantaged despite economic growth. Cohabitation had become an 
accepted social practice and had the capacity to perform a similar social function to 
marriage, although the permanence of marriage was preferable, both for individual 
families and the state. The arrival of human rights as a way of rationalising government 
did nothing to challenge the social and political supremacy of the officially legitimated 
couple, rather it acted to further reinforce its necessity. In order to implement human 
rights and equality imperatives government needed to identify and regulate more 
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marriage-like relationships. It needed to investigate, know, and categorise the intimate 
and familial lives of a greater range of citizens. As new forms of stable partnership 
became visible, and demanded the advantages conferred on married couples, human 
rights and equality arguments were deployed to re-enforce the privileges of long-term 
conjugality. The government objectives of social stability and economic growth could 
thus be furthered with more marriage law. 
The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 
provided for the civil registration and recognition of same (but not opposite) sex 
relationships, and extended many of the obligations of marriage law to these 
relationships. Adopting a Law Reform Commission proposal (LRC, 2006), the Act also 
initiated a presumptive recognition scheme for cohabitants, and created two new forms 
of regulated couple relationships; civil partnership and ‘qualified cohabitation.’ Civil 
partnership mirrored marriage, save with respect to some inelegant attempts to 
differentiate it, purportedly for the purpose of constitutional compliance. The main 
differences between the two were that marriage applied to opposite sex couples, and 
civil partnership to those of the same-sex; judicial separation was not available to civil 
partners; and the minimum period after breakdown before dissolution for civil partners 
was two years rather than four. Provisions in relation to financial orders were broadly 
similar to those for married couples, including the need to ensure proper provision, and 
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the potential for lifetime support. In relation to qualified cohabitants, the position was 
more complex. In order to avail him or herself of the statutory redress scheme a 
cohabitant was required to demonstrate that they were involved in a relationship of 
cohabitation that was intimate and committed, and lasted for five years (or two if the 
parties were of opposite-sex and had a child together). Additionally, they needed to 
show financial dependence on their partner. The forms of redress were much less 
comprehensive than those attaching to civil partnership or marriage. Crucially, however, 
if a qualified cohabitant demonstrated the seriousness of the relationship in accordance 
with the Act, and proved financial dependence during or arising from the relationship, 
he or she could, potentially, continue to seek redress for life  
By 2010 marriage was no longer a moral relationship; it was a legal manifestation 
of mutual commitment. The moral imperative to protect marriage had been replaced 
with social scientific justifications focused on stability in relationship practice. Economic 
growth and European equality imperatives came together in a drive to make marriage a 
partnership of (economic) equals. The untethering of marriage from morality facilitated 
its expansion beyond the traditional form. The 2010 Act applied selected incidents of 
marriage law to relationships depending on the degree to which they performed 
marriage, as then understood. In relation to civil partners, a public declaration of lifetime 
commitment would attract the obligations and advantages of marriage. By entering into 
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a lifetime, monogamous, couple relationships, same-sex partners would become an 
authorised unit, ready to support and maintain one and other in much the same way as 
a married couple. For cohabitants, the position was more complex, their performance 
of marriage needed to be more closely monitored to ensure that they were indeed 
intimate and committed, and that they had a record of accomplishment in mutual 
support and dependency. In order to avail themselves of redress, a cohabitant needed 
to show, not only commitment to the relationship, but also a financial investment in it, 
by demonstrating that they were economically dependent on their partner. Although 
the 2010 Act did not have the overriding ‘marriage saving’ objective of earlier marriage 
law reform, it did represent an attempt to secure the performance of marriage among 
a greater range of relationship types in the interests of social stability and economic 
growth.  
Conclusion. 
Recent political discourse has focused on marriage law’s potential as an instrument for 
the protection of human rights and the promotion of social equality. Existing law is 
conceptualised as oppressive and exclusionary in failing to extend social and economic 
privileges beyond the heterosexual couple, and reform, it is claimed, will liberate lives. 
The extension of marriage to same-sex couples equalises the treatment of individuals 
and undoubtedly has instrumental and symbolic value. Nonetheless, despite current 
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emphasis on the progressive potential of more marriage law, we must remain attentive 
to its dangers. As the genealogy of marriage law demonstrates, political recognition and 
regulation of relationships does not liberate individual practice. Rather, it categorises 
lives, divides them into authorised and unauthorised forms, supervises, observes and 
manages interpersonal conflict and connects relationship failure to social and economic 
instability. Marriage, when subject to social and religious control between the 
foundation of the Irish state and the 1970s, constructed women as dependents and 
those who failed at marriage as social problems. As the state apparatus gradually moved 
marriage from social and religious control, making it a political concern, lives were not 
liberated, they were simply transferred from one mode of control to another. 
Government assumed responsibility for the relationship practices of the population and 
undertook to modify them. The process of marriage law reform since the 1970s, coupled 
with shifts in how good government is conceptualised, has resulted in a dense network 
of regulation that requires us to declare publically who we are, who we love, how we 
live. These declarations have significant economic, social and cultural significant, not 
least because they re-enforce the necessity of the categorisation and act to further 
reaffirm it. In 1993, Katherine O’Donovan asked ‘why, notwithstanding the critique of 
legal marriage, people continue to uphold the institution.’ Her answer focused on the 
‘sacred, magical status’ of marriage (O’Donovan, 1992: 44). This research suggests a 
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more prosaic explanation. Marriage law, with its capacity to colonise public discussion 
of social problems, and link individual aspiration to the regulatory political objectives, is 
a uniquely effective technique of government.  
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Notes. 
1 Para 67, Reichsgesetz über die Beurkundung des Personenstands und die 
Eheschließung vom 6. Februar 1875. 
2 Foucault used the term ‘problematisation’ to describe the starting position for his 
historical analyses at the point of emergence of a crises in formerly silent behaviour. 
(Foucault 2001:74). 
3 Pursuant to Section 83 of the Public Assistance Act 1939 wilful neglect and failure to 
maintain a wife or child was a criminal offence.  
4 A means tested deserted wives allowance was introduced in 1970, and a social 
insurance based deserted wives benefit in 1973. 
5 Patrick Cooney, Dáil Deb 22 July 1975, vol 284, col 54-68. 
6 Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, Family Home Protection 
Act 1976. 
7 Walby (2007: 557) notes that incompleteness and failure are an integral part of law 
as governance; ‘total conformity and regulation are never achieved.’ 
8 Murphy v Ireland [1982] 1 IR 241, 286. 
9 Northampton County Council v ABF [1982] ILRM 164, 166. 
10 Social Welfare (no 2) Act 1989, s 1(b). 
11 Family Law Act 1995, s 18. 
12 Nora Owen, Dáil Deb 27 September 1995 vol 456, col 46. 
13 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s 20(2)(i). 
14 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s 5(1)(b).  
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15 Foucault, in writing about ancient Greek and Roman marriage practices notes a 
surge in popularity as marriage evolved from a private ceremony to a public institution 
increasingly subject to legal regulation. (Foucault, 1986:73). 
16 A useful account of Ireland’s economic development between 1992 and 2008 can be 
found at O’Riain (2013), 32-67. 
17 The precise legal significance of the agreement is discussed at Campbell et al (2003). 
